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 Public Organizational Existence:
 A Critique of Individualism in
 Democratic Administration
 Charles R. Davis
 The University of Southern Mississippi
 The study of public administration abounds in hierarchical theories of
 organization. In refreshing contrast, Vincent Ostrom's model of
 democratic administration stresses the enhancement of opportunities
 for individuals within public organizations. Focusing on Ostrom's
 theory, this article explores the ability of democratic administration to
 engender the social and political support required for public enterprise
 and to provide a philosophy that promotes an authentically demo-
 cratic work life.
 Charles R. Davis is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the
 University of Southern Mississippi. His articles have appeared in The
 International Journal of Public Administration and elsewhere.
 There are few works in political theory that more lucidly illuminate the
 contemporary contradictions between American regime values and
 organizational realities than Vincent Ostrom's The Intellectual Crisis in
 American Public Administration.I Not only does he expose how every-
 day organizational practices informed by traditional administrative
 theories are incompatible with classical liberal-constitutional principles,
 but he also vividly explicates how the dominant approaches found in the
 study of public administration serve to undermine and obstruct oppor-
 tunities for individuals. Namely, the prevalent model of public adminis-
 tration, as grounded in orthodox, neo-orthodox, and other hierarchical
 theories of organization, is elucidated as supporting structures based on
 one center of authority which ultimately reinforce managerial rather
 than more democratic forms of human interaction. In response to this
 prevailing model, Ostrom proposes a corrective, alternative paradigm2
 1. Vincent Ostrom, The Intellectual Crisis in American Public Administration, Revised
 edition (University, AL: The University of Alabama Press, 1974).
 2. Ibid., pp. 13-19. Ostrom uses "paradigm" interchangeably with the terms "model"
 and "theory," which is how it is also used in this essay. See too Vincent Ostrom, "The Un-
 disciplinary Discipline of Public Administration: A Response to the Stillman Critique,"
 Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 6 (1976).
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 398 Public Organizational Existence
 which he designates "democratic administration."3
 The purpose of this article is to examine critically Ostrom's model of
 democratic administration as this paradigm relates particularly to the ac-
 tions of individuals in organizations. This includes investigating
 Ostrom's works to assess the philosophical foundations of the hypotheti-
 cal individuals associated with his model. Subsequently, it will also con-
 sider the political implications of this individualism as a philosophy of
 everyday life.
 Specifically at issue is a critical evaluation of the prospect that method-
 ological individualism, if adopted by large segments of individuals as an
 everyday mode of reflection and activity, will engender the types of
 social-political action required to facilitate public-based enterprises.
 Before this central issue can be examined, however, key organizational
 features of democratic administration will be briefly explored.
 I. Democratic Administration
 Ostrom's model is primarily influenced by two major intellectual tradi-
 tions. One source is found in traditional, as well as contemporary, politi-
 cal thought associated with "polycentric," federal, or limited constitu-
 tional systems.4 The second stream of thought originates in classic
 market or liberal and modern public choice or collective choice theory.
 The paradigm produced by Ostrom's synthesis of these two traditions
 is a model radically at odds with dominant theories of organization
 found in the literature of public administration. His model of democratic
 administration contrasts with traditional public administration in at least
 three fundamentally political dimensions. These are: (1) his basic unit of
 analysis, (2) the structure of authority and its organizational distribu-
 tion, and (3) the mode of decision making and its allocation among
 organizational participants. A brief inspection of these three dimensions
 as compared to key corresponding features of the traditional public
 administration paradigm will serve to outline Ostrom's model.
 Basic Unit of Political Analysis
 Contrary to managerial-oriented perspectives which proliferate in the
 organizational theories associated with public administration over the
 3. Ibid., pp. 78-80. Ostrom notes that Max Weber made "passing reference" to "demo-
 cratic administration" as a form of administration rejected by Weber.
 4. Vincent Ostrom, Charles M. Tiebout, and Robert Warren, "The Organization of
 Government in Metropolitan Areas: A Theoretical Inquiry," American Political Science
 Review, 55 (1961): 831 and 840.
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 past century, it is the individual who occupies a central position in
 Ostrom's model. Throughout his paradigm, he devotes particular atten-
 tion to considering and enhancing the way in which to generate prospects
 for individual opportunities.
 Whether the issue be government in general or public administration in
 particular, Ostrom asserts it is "still individuals who form the basic unit
 that comprise political communities."s That is, since "actions of govern-
 ment derive from the interests of individuals, to be effective, actions of
 government must relate to the conduct of individuals.''6 This is especially
 apparent in his perspective with respect to the initial premises on which
 democratic administration as a "general system" of political organiza-
 tion is constructed. The starting point in building his model includes:
 1) an egalitarian assumption that everyone is qualified to partici-
 pate in the conduct of public affairs,
 2) the reservation of all important decisions for consideration by all
 members of the community,
 3) restriction of the power of command to a necessary minimum,
 and
 4) modification of the status of administrative functionaries from
 that of masters to that of public servants.7
 Structure of Authority
 While Ostrom's model has a basic commitment toward individuals and
 the enhancement of their opportunities, it also recognizes and provides
 for such individual opportunities to take place in organizations designed
 to offset the authoritarian proclivities typically associated with govern-
 ment bureaucracies. Simply, the pursuit of human aspirations occurs
 through the design of multiple organizational arrangements character-
 ized by fragmentation and the overlap of authority. The multiple and
 overlapping organizational jurisdictions serve to structure his model
 along the lines of federal principles as found in the Constitution with
 separate institutions.8 As such, Ostrom's model is also diametrically op-
 posed to most contemporary organizational theories. In short, demo-
 5. Vincent Ostrom, The Political Theory of a Compound Republic, Second Edition,
 Revised and Enlarged (Lincoln: The University of Nebraska Press, 1987), p. 41.
 6. Ibid., p. 35.
 7. Ostrom, Intellectual Crisis, p. 80.
 8. Ostrom, Compound Republic, 2nd edition, pp. 26-27, and pp. 201-214. In his analy-
 sis of administration and the polity in general, Ostrom has vividly illuminated the perils of
 unitary perspectives on authority and sovereignty on "shared communities of understand-
 ing of what it means to live in a self-governing society," p. 231.
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 cratic administration is most aptly "characterized by polycentricity" in
 authority as opposed to monocentric organizational theories.9
 Democratic administration does not advocate the absolute elimination
 of bureaucratic types of organizations. Simply, some public goods and
 services may require such an organizational form, (e.g., large utilities.)
 Rather, the paradigm of democratic administration recognizes that a
 "variety of different organizational arrangements can be used to provide
 different public goods and services." Moreover "such organizations can
 be coordinated through various multiple-organizational arrangements
 including trading and contracting to mutual advantage, adjudication, as
 well as the power of command in limited hierarchy."10 In elaborating the
 virtues of the polycentric authority structure in democratic administra-
 tion, Ostrom notes that multiple-organizational arrangements provide
 "the necessary conditions for maintaining a stable political order which
 can advance human welfare under rapidly changing conditions." In con-
 trast,
 perfection in the hierarchical ordering of a professionally trained
 public service accountable to a single center of power will reduce
 the capability of a large administrative system to respond to diverse
 preferences among citizens for many different goods and services
 and cope with environmental problems."
 Likewise, perfect hierarchy in organization "will not maximize efficiency
 as measured in least-cost in time, effort or resources.""
 One of the basic propositions of Ostrom's model focuses on the con-
 cern of traditional political theory for political authority. He observes,
 the exercise of political authority-a necessary power to do good-
 will be usurped by those who perceive an opportunity to exploit
 such powers to their own advantage and to the detriment of others
 unless authority is divided and different authorities are so orga-
 nized as to limit and control one another.13
 Decision Making
 Multiple-organizational arrangements are not the only means of alleviat-
 ing concentrated power. The third major difference between democratic
 9. Ostrom, Intellectual Crisis, p. 81.
 10. Ibid., p. 111.
 11. Ibid., p. 112.
 12. Ibid.
 13. Ibid., p. 111.
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 administration and traditional public administration lies in their respec-
 tive orientations to organizational decision making. In contrast to
 policies formulated by management and/or professional elites which can
 be imposed on the organization by varying degrees of bureaucratic
 despotism, Ostrom asserts that "the structure of public administration
 cannot be organized apart from processes of political choice. "14 Further-
 more, the notion of political choice in his model is clearly one of consti-
 tutional choice. Because, as he points out, "the tasks of establishing and
 altering organizational arrangements in a democratic society is [sic] to be
 conceived as a problem in constitutional decision-making."''
 This decision-making mode, however, is not limited to structural ar-
 rangements. In a recent revision and expansion of The Political Theory
 of a Compound Republic, Ostrom argues,
 constitutional choice need not be limited to constitutional conven-
 tions or amendments pertaining to national governments, but can
 apply to all institutions of human governance. .... A Constitution
 can be defined as a set of rules that specify the terms and conditions
 of government. 6
 In a specific conceptualization of what is meant by constitutional choice
 in his model, Ostrom says it is "simply a choice of decision-rules assign-
 ing decision-making capabilities among a community of people for mak-
 ing future decisions in the conduct of an organization or an
 enterprise."17
 According to his view, such decision rules originate with assumptions
 common to a model of man found in the works of Hobbes and also in
 that of Hamilton and Madison.
 The common assumptions of the model of man that Ostrom finds in
 these classical political theorists can be summarized: (1) Individual
 humans are the "basic units for forming any political community." (2)
 Decision rules order relationships in any association, i.e., decision rules
 are propositions which "assign decision-making capabilities in social
 relationships" insofar as they limit choice "as a necessary condition" for
 insuring predictability. As such, discretion is permitted for the pursuit of
 some possibilities at the exclusion of others. Consequently, "if actions
 injurious to others can be excluded from the domain of choice, the
 human welfare would be enhanced by the pursuit of lawful possibility."
 14. Ibid., p. 66.
 15. Ibid., p. 111.
 16. Ostrom, Compound Republic, 2nd edition, p. 5.
 17. Ostrom, Intellectual Crisis, p. 66.
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 (3) Decision rules are wholly dependent upon individual persons for their
 formulation and alteration. Ostrom writes:
 If persons are to act consistently and productively in relation to one
 another, then means must be available for constraining and resolv-
 ing conflicts which arise in accordance with existing decision rules
 and for devising new decision rules to comprehend new social
 conditions. 18
 (4) These decision rules are dependent upon the assignment of "extra-
 ordinary powers to some persons to enforce decision rules in relation to
 other members of a community." Such rules are simply not self-enforc-
 ing. These extraordinary powers include the capacity to impose coercion
 as they thus "involve the potential use of lawful capabilities to impose
 deprivation on others." (5) The subsequent form of political organiza-
 tion following these assumptions is dependent on "a radical inequality"
 in the assignment of decision-making capabilities to those who exercise
 the prerogatives for controlling and allocating the decision-making
 capabilities of others. The inequality of political conditions, Ostrom
 asserts, "must necessarily exist in any political association."19
 While these common assumptions ultimately condition the general
 political organization of democratic administration, they do not tell us
 how the hypothetical individuals may or do act as solitary persons. The
 following section reviews this ideal-type individualism and the self-
 interest and reasoning processes used in this individualism as found in
 Ostrom's works. The foundation of democratic administration rests on
 this individualism. Furthermore, to understand the prospects offered by
 this paradigm for both authentic political action and genuine democratic
 involvement in public organization, it is necessary to examine Ostrom's
 basic unit of analysis more closely.
 II. Democratic Administration's Individualism and Influences
 The perspective of democratic administration toward human actors is
 grounded in an ideal-type individualism. Specifically, it is a method-
 ological individualism that makes certain assumptions about human
 nature and is informed by a particular view of human rationality and ac-
 tion. Ostrom's conceptualization of methodological individualism is
 based in enlightened self-interest, as well as an instrumental rationality
 that rests on a cost-calculus of relative advantage.
 18. Ibid., p. 108.
 19. Ibid., pp. 108-109.
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 He acknowledges that his views on self-interest and economic reason-
 ing emerge from several traditional and modern political analysts,
 among them James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, Mancur Olson,
 Charles Lindblom, and Daniel Elazar, among others. The classical politi-
 cal theorists his works most often cite are: Hobbes, Hamilton, Madison,
 and Tocqueville. Ostrom's broader political economic and theoretical
 outlook, as well as his idea of individualism, is in large part a synthesis of
 these four classical thinkers.
 Tocqueville's Influences
 The works of Alexis de Tocqueville are frequently cited by Ostrom in the
 formulation of his model. Tocqueville not only provides a foundation
 for the collective or shared nature of authority, but the French theorist
 also offers a perspective on the proper understanding of self-interest.
 Ostrom sees in Tocqueville's writings a way or a mode of reasoning
 found also in other classical liberal thinkers such as Hobbes, Hamilton,
 and Madison. Specifically, he finds in Tocqueville the description of a
 "pervasive motivating and regulating force in American politics-the
 idea of rightly understood self-interest."20 In Ostrom's view, this self-
 interest is Tocqueville's "first corollary of the principle of the sover-
 eignty of the people." He infers from Tocqueville that
 each person is first of all his own sovereign in the government of his
 own affairs; each township is sovereign in all that concerns itself,
 alone, and is subject to the sovereignty of the state in matters of
 general concern beyond the township.21
 Ostrom also finds in Tocqueville's writings, as well as in those of
 Hamilton and Madison, an alternative way of thinking about the "diver-
 sity of individual preferences and the diverse nature of goods and serv-
 ices" as opposed to those of mere "organizational structure.""22 He
 points out that this alternative involves economic reasoning:
 Tocqueville, Hamilton and Madison were political economists in
 the sense that they used economic assumptions to reason about the
 human condition and about the effect that political regimes would
 20. Vincent Ostrom, The Political Theory of a Compound Republic: A Reconstruction
 of the Logical Foundations of American Democracy as Presented in The Federalist (Blacks-
 burg, VA: Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 1971), p. 4.
 21. Ibid.
 22. Robert Bish and Vincent Ostrom. Understanding Urban Government (Washington,
 DC: Domestic Affairs Study 20, American Enterprise Institution for Public Policy
 Research, 1973), p. 17.
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 have upon the capacity of people to advance their "self-interest
 rightly understood," to use Tocqueville's phrase. All human inter-
 ests are rooted in the self; but the degree of selfishness depends
 upon the social-space and social-time horizons that individuals use
 in their choices and actions. A function of the political process is to
 bias individual decision making toward taking into account a wider
 community of people and a longer time horizon.23
 Ostrom's rendering of Tocqueville's thoughts on self-interest as being
 congruent with the emphasis placed on this concept by Hamilton and
 Madison misses Tocqueville's more sociality-based view of man in nine-
 teenth-century American society. Put simply, Ostrom overlooks the
 greater, more holistic concern that Tocqueville attaches to the impor-
 tance of "civic virtue."24 Furthermore, Tocqueville's remarks on indi-
 vidual and local sovereignty are more fully applicable in the classical con-
 text of public welfare and common freedom, as opposed to being limited
 to individualistic self-interest and economic reasoning.
 In Part II, Book Two of Democracy in America, Tocqueville expresses
 concern on how unrestrained private interests and individualism work to
 the detriment of positively promoting the public good. He suggests, for
 example, that
 individualism proceeds from erroneous judgment more than de-
 praved feeling . . . individualism, at first, only saps the virtues of
 public life; but, in the long run, it attacks and destroys all others,
 and is at length absorbed in downright selfishness.25
 It is essential, Tocqueville says, that men be drawn from their individual-
 istic interests in order that the greater public welfare be attained.26 In
 short, individualism impedes man's understanding of himself as primar-
 ily a social being. Tocqueville also asserts that it is necessary for men to
 attend to the interests of the public, first by necessity, afterward by
 choice: what was intentional becomes instinct; and, by dint of
 working for the good of one's fellow-citizens the habit and tastes of
 serving them is at length acquired.27
 23. Ostrom, Compound Republic, 1st edition, p. 7.
 24. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, specially edited and abridged by
 Richard D. Heffner (New York: Mentor Books, 1976). Tocqueville does indeed observe the
 pervasiveness of private interests on human actions in the United States, but he simulta-
 neously states how, he in a "hundred instances" conveyed the impact of "real and great
 sacrifices for the public welfare," p. 197.
 25. Ibid., p. 193.
 26. Ibid., p. 195.
 27. Ibid., p. 197.
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 Hamilton and Madison's Contributions
 It is in the papers of The Federalist, as interpreted in Ostrom's The
 Political Theory of the Compound Republic, especially the first edition,
 that Madison and Hamilton's views on economic reasoning and self-
 interest are most evident. Likewise, Ostrom interprets their assumptions
 on individuals and human behavior as congruent with a public choice
 orientation to social reality. In addition, he finds in Hamilton and
 Madison the justification for linking humans, individually and collec-
 tively, with the structure of authority subsequently found in his demo-
 cratic administration. He argues that these thinkers "use economic
 reasoning to analyze the problems of constitutional choice" but also that
 Madison and Hamilton, like Tocqueville, are political economists as well
 as theorists who "saw people using a cost-calculus to choose among
 alternative possibilities" in human existence.2"
 It was noted earlier that Ostrom's methodological, ideal-type, repre-
 sentative, or hypothetical individualism presupposes individuals to be
 "the basic unit of analysis."" 29 This applies to both democratic adminis-
 tration and public choice theory. Likewise, it was observed that
 Hamilton and Madison's "first assumptions" include the proposition
 that individual men are to be considered basic units in establishing politi-
 cal institutions. The other assumption he finds in the writings of these
 two Federalists is that "individuals are self-interested and will seek to
 enhance their relative advantage."30
 According to Ostrom, relative advantage or marginal utility as found
 in The Federalist's individualistic assumptions about political experience
 is more consistent with his own views on enlightened self-interest than
 with a "narrow conception of self-interest." He simply rejects the notion
 of an "unrestrained or unlimited pursuit of self-interest" which leads in
 turn "to a state where each individual is at war with every other individ-
 ual."31 Instead, Ostrom finds in Hamilton's works the assumption that
 individuals will always be confronted by circumstances that involve the
 scarcity of goods and services. Moreover, he observes, "both Hamilton
 and Madison assume that individuals will have reference to self-interest
 or 'self-love' in the pursuit of opportunities or interests." And "it is
 28. Vincent Ostrom, "Some Problems in Doing Political Theory: A Response to Golem-
 biewski's 'Critique'," American Political Science Review, 71 (1977): 1509.
 29. Ibid., p. 1511. Ostrom insists his focus on "methodological individualism" can be
 "used to analyze behavior even in the absence of any authority on the part of the individual
 to decide a course of action" and that, "using the individual as the basic unit of analysis
 does not mean that one is confined to that unit of analysis."
 30. Ostrom, Compound Republic, 1st edition, p. 17.
 31. Ostrom, "Some Problems," p. 1513.
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 from this base that human energy, ambition and productivity arise."
 Thus, sources of conflict arise which consequently necessitate the
 "design of political institutions" which depend "upon connecting the in-
 terests of man with the assignment of decision-making capabilities so
 that the intent of one is constrained by the interests of others."32
 Ostrom notes that Madison explicitly assumes that "individuals will
 always be confronted by choosing from a mixed bag of imperfect
 goods." Madison's concern, Ostrom observes, is "clearly one of choos-
 ing the greater good rather than the lesser good despite imperfect qual-
 ities attributed to men and their political institutions."33 But the calculus
 of relative advantage is not limited to human passion and ambition only
 in the context of a short-term calculus. Hamilton also argues that it "per-
 mits reasoned considerations of 'policy, utility and justice' in terms of a
 long-term calculus."34
 Ostrom also finds in Madison's writings situations where "value oc-
 currences may be good for some [and yet] be detrimental to others." In
 such circumstances, citizens may be required "to give attention to an ex-
 tended social calculus of one's interest vis-a-vis others interests and to
 select those opportunities which will realize the greater good rather than
 the lesser good. 35 The self-interest of relative advantage, for both the
 short- and long-term basis, therefore necessitates conditions whereby
 legal and political processes for constraint can be interposed upon
 human affairs. These processes in democratic administration, as noted,
 rest on constitutional choice and multi-organizational arrangements with
 fragmented and overlapping authority.36
 Ostrom's interpretation of the reasoning of Madison and Hamilton as
 grounded in individualistic assumptions of self-interested calculations
 presents a perspective whereby the political is secondary to a primary
 focus on economic and private concerns. That is, the instrumental
 reasoning of the private person as primarily a market-economic being
 takes precedence over the traditional concern with political morality and
 the general or public good. Ostrom's explanation of the roles of self-
 interest with respect to thought about and the drafting of the Constitu-
 tion is not without its challenges. Others have argued that the roots of the
 republican experiment are more fully explained by the roles of civic vir-
 tue and the development of collective responsibility. These interests are
 seen as overriding the Federalist concerns for the "guarantee of individ-
 32. Ostrom, Compound Republic, 1st edition, pp. 21-22.
 33. Ibid., p. 22.
 34. Ibid.
 35. Ibid., p. 23.
 36. Ostrom, Compound Republic, 2nd edition, pp. 48-49.
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 ual security.""37 William Sullivan has recently argued that the measure of
 the Constitution "was not the achievement of a particular moral quality
 of civic life.""8 A central concern of public philosophy in the eighteenth-
 century republican tradition, Sullivan insists,
 was to avoid at all costs the possibility of despotism and its fore-
 runner, the encouragement of exclusive self-interest. They sought
 to promote civic virtue though an active public life built up through
 an egalitarian spirit of self-restraint and mutual aid.39
 Sullivan notes further that the untrammeled pursuit of self-interest was
 seen by the "Real Whig" republicans as drawing men away "from their
 full development as ethical persons" and thereby "undermining the civic
 spirit on which liberty depended."40
 The model of man and the perspective on human action found in the
 writings of Hamilton and Madison contrast sharply with the views of
 their republican opposition. Their opponents argued for a morality
 wherein man is recognized as a social creature who engages in a public
 ethos as a political citizen. It is a perspective oriented to cultivating a civil
 spirit and a democratic ethics for collective participation in the deter-
 mination of the common good. In contrast, the self-interest individual-
 ism of Madison and Hamilton is, at base, an economic and strategic view
 toward human action.41
 The Influences of Thomas Hobbes
 The writings of Thomas Hobbes are also a significant influence on the
 type of individualism found in democratic administration. Hobbes's im-
 pact on Ostrom's thinking is apparent with respect to both enlightened
 self-interest and methodological individualism. While Ostrom rejects the
 Hobbesian "unitary theory of sovereignty" in favor of political theory
 grounded in "a general theory of limited constitutions,"' 42his individual-
 ism is clearly conditioned by Hobbes's works.
 Self-interest in Ostrom's view, as noted, is dependent on right under-
 standing or enlightened understanding. Enlightened understanding is
 necessary, he argues, to avoid the "blind, unlimited pursuit of self-
 37. William M. Sullivan, Reconstructing Public Philosophy (Berkeley: University of
 California Press, 1986), p. 12.
 38. Ibid.
 39. Ibid.
 40. Ibid., p. 191.
 41. Ibid., pp. 191-192.
 42. Ostrom, Compound Republic, 2nd edition, p. 214.
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 interest." Following his interpretation of Tocqueville, Ostrom suggests,
 "learning occurs and self-interest becomes enlightened." Therefore, en-
 lightened self-interest can be a useful assumption about human behavior
 to the extent that the "relevant choice situation is made explicit-i.e., the
 rule structure and the nature of goods is established."43
 Furthermore, the right understanding of self-interest in Ostrom's
 perspective "is consistent with the moral precepts in Hobbes' law of
 nature." How his, Tocqueville's, and Hobbes's views are seen as com-
 patible in this context is apparent:
 Because of the interaction that occurs among individuals, individ-
 uals find that instead of realizing their own preservation, as they
 would prefer, they are each threatened with their own extinction.
 Hobbes conjectures that individuals who find themselves confront-
 ing such a puzzle will then resort to reason and think through the
 conditions-the moral precepts-that will enable them to realize a
 state of peace rather than war ... Hobbes bases his analysis upon
 implications that follow from recognizing the essential capabilities
 and desires of others. He assumes that individuals will be prepared
 to order their preferences so long as others do so too.44
 Ostrom also identifies with Hobbes's notion of methodological indi-
 vidualism. This is evident in his remarks regarding "some basic under-
 standing about human nature." Ostrom notes that "perhaps the most
 distinctive characteristic of human beings is their capacity for learning."
 In turn, learning entails the "development of an image about the order
 of events and relationships that occur."45 Subsequently, each individual
 can also "calculate the probable consequences that can be expected to
 flow from alternative courses of action." Such courses of action derive
 from instrumental forms of knowledge. Additionally, "each individual
 has an independent capacity to weigh alternative possibilities in relation
 to the internal indicators that might be referred to as preferences." This
 brings the issue of choice into consideration and, according to Ostrom,
 choice "is a process of selection that derives from weighing of alterna-
 tives in terms of preferences." He says, "in forms of voluntary actions
 each individual will take" his own preferences into account. As such,
 humans can never be seen as "perfectly obedient automata," because
 any time "discretion is exercised, individuals can be expected to consider
 43. Ostrom, "Some Problems," p. 1513.
 44. Ibid.
 45. Vincent Ostrom, "Artisanship and Artifact," Public Administration Review, 40
 (1980): 310-311.
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 their own interests in the actions they take."46
 On the basis of these assumptions, Ostrom asks rhetorically, "how do
 we take account of the strategies that individuals can be expected to pur-
 sue?" According to his perspective, two strategies are available. One is to
 provide individuals with opportunities to interact with others, communi-
 cating their preferences while also taking into account other interests.
 But Ostrom sees this as merely a complementary method to a more fun-
 damental strategy of methodological individualism which also involves
 instrumental reasoning. Namely, this more basic strategy relies on
 the presumption that human beings share a basic similitude of
 thoughts and passions, and by taking the perspective of others, at-
 tempt to understand the basic structure and logic of their situation
 and infer the strategy they are likely to pursue. This is essentially
 the strategy inherent in methodological individualism.47
 Ostrom's orientation here closely parallels his interpretation of
 Hobbes's "basic methodological stance," which he finds in Hobbes's
 "Kingdom of God by Nature." Of Hobbes's position, he says,
 human beings are potentially self-knowing creatures that share a
 similitude of thoughts and passions characteristic of all mankind.
 Underlying the ideosyncracies of individual personalities is a more
 basic structure of thoughts and passions that is common to all
 human beings. By reflecting upon the way one thinks and acts, one
 can come to an understanding of oneself as an autonomous
 creature and use one's reflective knowledge to order one's life in a
 way that enables one to become a responsible being, both in relat-
 ing to other human beings and to othe forms of being.48
 The Ostrom and Hobbes perspectives on methodological individualism
 are in essential harmony in that each sees man as fundamentally an
 autonomous or self-knowing being who seeks to comprehend and act
 responsibly through strategic thinking.
 III. Origins of Ostrom's Views On Human Nature and Political Society
 The concept of the individual found in Ostrom's paradigm can be identi-
 fied in political philosophy by the value emphasis and the mode of
 46. Ibid., p. 311, emphasis added.
 47. Ibid.
 48. Vincent Ostrom, "Hobbes, Covenant and Constitutions," Publius: The Journal of
 Federalism, 10 (1980): 96, emphasis added.
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 reasoning associated with his representative individual. It entails autono-
 mous actors who embrace an enlightened understanding of self-interest
 and who employ calculative reasoning to determine both short and long-
 term advantage. His political society is one of constitutionalism located
 in polycentric organizational structures as human artifacts.
 In the broad sweep of western political economy, Ostrom's approach
 is clearly within the Natural Law tradition. How democratic administra-
 tion derives originally from this tradition is apparent in at least three
 ways. First, it is evident in Ostrom's concern for the individual as the
 basic unit of analysis. Second, it is prevalent in the primacy he attaches
 to a means-ends rationality of the ideal-type individual. Third, the types
 of interaction envisioned between individuals in multi-organizational ar-
 rangements is also well within the Natural Law orientation.
 The pervasiveness of Natural Law on the structure of western political
 economy has long been acknowledged. Its influence on human con-
 sciousness in America is also widely recognized. Jon Wisman, for exam-
 ple, has explicated Natural Law's philosophical foundations, its histori-
 cal evolution, and, indeed, its impact on human thought in modern
 political economy. Wisman notes that by the late eighteenth century,
 "the sphere of market activity had progressed to the point that it could
 no longer be viewed as guided or regulated by either divine or civil
 authority." What was required, he notes, was a "secular frame of refer-
 ence, within which the laws of motion of markets could be explained."
 Since such "laws had long been worked out," the task that remained was
 "to sever the dependence of these laws on the legitimation contexts of
 religion and central political authority." This break, he continues,
 "'came with the maturation of a new secular cosmology built on a
 mechanical analogy. The universe, social as well as physical, was to be
 viewed as functioning mechanistically according to Natural Law."49
 While it was a mechanistic cosmology used to depict the natural order,
 Natural Law was also "readily adopted to depict the economic order."
 In other words, it "was transformed to refer to mechanistic market inter-
 actions of atom-like individuals." Thereby, the laws of nature which
 regulate social interaction would "not differ from those laws which are
 operative in a mechanical physical universe."
 Just as the force of gravity was seen as the motor force and the
 cosmic glue which propelled and held the physical world harmoni-
 ously together so individual self-interest could be seen as providing
 49. Jon Wisman, "Legitimation, Ideology-Critique and Economics," Social Research,
 46 (Summer, 1979): 300.
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 the driving force and social glue which motivated and cohered the
 economic order.50
 Consequently, with the rendering of Natural Law by Thomas Hobbes,
 attempts were progressively made to legitimate political power not by
 traditional political morality or religious authority, but rather by
 purposive-rational criteria."5 Namely, it was through Natural Law that
 modern economic thought became a powerful source of legitimation in
 the contemporary state. Equally, on the daily level of human interaction,
 it was through Natural Law that "instrumental or means-ends rationality
 stemming from purposive-rational action came increasingly to character-
 ize human consciousness.""52
 This transformation in human consciousness did more than merely
 weaken traditional religious-political authority. In effect, it compelled
 the legitimation of state authority to arise from the "materialist realm of
 economic activity."53 As such, political authority was to be "rendered
 subservient to economic activity." This development, however, served to
 alter the understanding of the role of the state in fundamental ways.
 Moreover, this altered understanding is not only found in Hobbes, but
 also from Federalists down to Ostrom and public choice theorists.
 Specifically, this modern understanding is essentially one in which "the
 role of the state was in effect reduced from that of guiding economic af-
 fairs to that of providing a suitable legal and political framework within
 which economic affairs might be left to themselves.""54 The state, in other
 words, is reduced to little more than a market apparatus.
 The influence of Natural Law, therefore, serves as a powerful impetus
 in the formulation of Ostrom's thought. It is readily acknowledged by
 Ostrom, as well as by the theorists upon whom he draws, e.g., classic and
 modern public choice thinkers such as Buchanan and Tullock. This is
 evident in both his basic unit of analysis and in democratic administra-
 tion's structure. First, for instance, in opposition to hierarchical
 bureaucracy, Ostrom's multiple-organizational arrangements are con-
 ceived as "fundamentally different structures" envisioned as "providing
 a variety of market-type relationships in the public sector.""55 Second, it
 50. Ibid., p. 302.
 51. Ibid., p. 298. See also: Jiirgen Habermas, Toward a Rational Society (Boston, MA:
 Beacon Press, 1970), p. 96.
 52. Ibid., p. 303.
 53. Ibid., p. 304.
 54. Ibid., p. 304-305.
 55. John Brademas, Neil Pierce, Elliot Richardson, Vincent Ostrom, and Casper
 Weinberger, "Organizational Rationality, Congressional Oversight and Decentralization:
 An Exchange," Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 8 (1978): 117.
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 is within these polycentric organizations that collective action is seen as
 facilitated. Yet, the concept of collective action in Ostrom's paradigm is
 a restrictive conceptualization of collective action. Put simply, collective
 action in his, Buchanan's, and Tullock's perspective is merely aggregate
 action of atomized individuals. That is, in their view, collective action is
 understood as "the action of individuals when they choose to accomplish
 purposes collectively rather than individually, and government is seen as
 nothing more than a set of purposes, the machine, which allows collec-
 tive action to take place."5s
 Ostrom has argued that the economic man of the Natural Law tradi-
 tion "is replaced by 'man' the decision-maker,"5s but his grounding of
 the ideal-person's singular and collective choice remains firmly based on
 atomistic assumptions, market-type interactions, and the purposive ra-
 tionality dimensions central to the Natural Law cosmology. While his in-
 dividualism moderates pure self-interest with a calculus of relative ad-
 vantage in choice decisions based on weighing and ranking options from
 "more?" or "less" alternatives, Ostrom's perspective remains rooted in
 the laws of nature tradition and its primacy in economics.58
 IV. Democratic Administration's Individualism and Political Action
 The ideal-type individualism found in Ostrom's democratic administra-
 tion is problematic in two ways. First, this individualism is unlikely to
 promote the type of human action needed for public enterprises. Second,
 it also presents obstacles to humans adopting his individualism as a way
 of life in that it hinders their understanding of themselves as social beings
 and as active participants in reforming or reconstructing social reality.
 Ostrom 's Individualism: Private or Public Action?
 The foundation assumptions of democratic administration in individuals
 as self-interested, autonomous beings who engage in calculae of relative
 advantage poses problems for achieving the type of political action
 needed to foster and sustain public organization.
 56. James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent (Ann Arbor: The
 University of Michigan Press, 1974), p. 13.
 57. Vincent Ostrom and Elinor Ostrom, "Public Choice: A Different Approach to the
 Study of Public Administration," Public Administration Review, 31 (March-April, 1971):
 205.
 58. Buchanan and Tullock, Calculus of Consent, p. 18. The theory and economic reason-
 ing by these scholars is seen by Ostrom as "consistent with the way of thinking" that was
 used by Hamilton and Madison and by Tocqueville in his works. Also see: Ostrom, "Un-
 disciplinary Discipline," p. 306; and see also: Bish and Ostrom, "Public Choice," p. 17.
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 In the first place, Ostrom's individualism generates the antithesis of
 common, social or shared political action. It advocates activity that is
 primarily self-interested and only secondarily social. It is also basically
 socio-economic activity. Second, his fundamental commitment to orga-
 nizational life is a private rather than public commitment to social reality
 by virtue of the priority given individuals and the reasoning processes in-
 herent in instrumental rationality. That is, action generated by self-
 interest, enlightened or not, is a private commitment first and foremost
 to one's self. Thereby, it is primarily a competitive rather than a coopera-
 tive way to relate to others, as well as to one's social institutions.
 Kirk Thompson, for example, elucidates how self-interest is thor-
 oughly grounded in the economic realm and, as such, can only engender
 a politics of economic interest and subsequently economic man. He
 observes that the citizen of Aristotle is one who "fulfills his highest
 potentialities in the public realm and to do so he must extricate himself
 from the concerns of the economic unit.""9
 Therefore in pursuing self-interest, which in effect is to say private in-
 terest, the public, common, or general dimension of political action is
 diminished. In short, "the private life, not life in public, has become the
 good life." Self-interest, Thompson states, generates human activity that
 is most appropriately characterized as political behavior rather than
 political action. Such behavior includes "activities that are not fully
 public, i.e., that do not take place in public or do not involve common or
 public interest as a referent."60 He also points out that "where economic
 interests do give rise to political activity, that activity is devoid of the
 concern for the common weal that is characteristic of political action.""61
 Ostrom's Individualism: Man as an Autonomous or Social Being?
 The Natural Law orientation to individuals, as well as Ostrom's adher-
 ence to .this view, is also problematic for the achievement of political ac-
 tion required of public organization. Not only did Natural Law's ascend-
 ancy help to legitimate market economics and self-interest as the "driv-
 ing force and social glue which motivated and harmoniously cohered the
 economic order," but, as importantly, if not more so, it provided the
 basis for the increasing legitimation by purposive-instrumental rational-
 ity over practical or traditional reason by consensual norms.62
 59. Kirk Thompson, "Constitutional Theory and Political Action," Journal of Politics,
 31 (August, 1969): 655.
 60. Ibid., p. 660.
 61. Ibid., p. 675.
 62. Wisman, "Legitimation," p. 297.
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 The adoption of Natural Law cosmology led to the development and
 recognition in social thought of the postulate of autonomous man. In
 other words, autonomous man is an individual whose being is
 thoroughly grounded in the subjectivity of the inner-self. Socially, this
 view implies "essentially equal and free activities of individuals." This
 orientation to man as autonomous, according to Wisman, is mediated by
 a simultaneous view of "an impersonal and impartial mechanistic
 market system." Each of these views is also to be found in Ostrom and in
 his rendering of Hobbes, Hamilton, and Madison.63
 By following a Natural Law derived from the laws of motion,
 economic thought was grounded on an analogy to classic mechanics
 which "provided a static view of reality." While men as individuals were
 obviously perceived as humans, their institutions were conceptualized as
 mechanical parts within the larger social universe which was also
 analogized as an apparatus. But, the increasing predominance of
 purposive-instrumental rationality inherent in market interaction and ex-
 pansion provided the foundation for economic thought to become "for-
 mal and ahistorical." Of more importance to this discussion, the basic
 unit of human nature in this economic thought, i.e., the individual, also
 become "universal, that is, a-historical and a-cultural."64
 The ahistorical and universal characteristic imputed to individuals in
 Ostrom and his influences follow this tradition. In terms of social
 thought, his methodological individualism represents a specialist view of
 social reality. Not only does his individualism transcend cultural and
 historical differences among people, but human freedom and subjectiv-
 ity are defined only from an individualist perspective. Rather than seeing
 man as a social or political animal in the sociality perspective, Ostrom's
 individualism is primarily premised on man as self-interested. Likewise,
 reasoning is primarily a cognitive process of calculation of the individual
 person as an autonomous or self-knowing being.
 The ramifications of man as an autonomous being as originally con-
 ceived in Hobbes were to be worked out subsequently in Kant's "revolu-
 tionary discovery of subjectivity, revolutionary because it conceives the
 human subject as the active constructor of his universe of meaning." The
 understanding of man as self-knowing or autonomous as found in
 Hobbes and Ostrom is not only a perception of reality thoroughly based
 in the inner self, it is also an orientation which encourages people to see
 "even social problems" as "solved in terms of relationships of individ-
 uals.''65
 63. Ibid., p. 305.
 64. Ibid., p. 307.
 65. David Rasmussen, "Between Autonomy and Sociality," Cultural Hermeneutics, 1
 (1973): 8-9.
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 It is also an individualism that is ultimately subjective in the sense that
 mind is prior to experience. Ostrom's and Hobbes's assumption that
 man is an autonomous or self-knowing creature denies man as a social or
 political animal. David Rasmussen offers a lucid critique of human ex-
 perience understood as based primarily in subjectivity. He argues that
 "instead of man being conceived as a rational being who by free exercise
 of rational activity creates his own meaning, he is a contingent being who
 achieves his identity in relationships" to other selves and human institu-
 tions.66 In premising man in self-knowing, autonomous subjectivity, and
 rejecting or delegating the social dimensions of man to a secondary con-
 sideration, the notion of identity that man finds in the world is reduced
 to the solitary effort of the individual. In this sense the representative in-
 dividuals in Ostrom's model must be primarily competitive rather than
 cooperative beings, i.e., creatures who are pitted against others and their
 institutions.
 The concept of a man as an autonomous, self-knowing being therefore
 facilitates a preoccupation with the self and serves to inhibit awareness of
 problems that are social in origin. Likewise, it inhibits one's awareness of
 social institutions themselves as historically manmade phenomena which
 are potentially open to collaborative, social efforts at reform or recon-
 struction.
 V. Methodological Individualism as a Philosophy of Everyday Life
 Not only does the individualism of democratic administration pose
 obstacles to social-political democratic action necessary for shared par-
 ticipation in public concerns, it also presents personal obstacles for indi-
 viduals who adopt it as a way of everyday existence. Namely, as a mode
 of reflection and activity in daily situations, methodological individual-
 ism limits understanding and meaning.
 Methodological individualism as found in Ostrom's model does indeed
 permit a functional understanding of how individuals or groups act
 based on causal modes of thinking. It cannot, however, call into question
 the ultimate purposes or the cultural contexts forming such actions. The
 reasoning process inherent in Ostrom's individualism cannot indicate
 why such actions are or are not reflective of the general good, because his
 methodological individualism, like that of Max Weber, sees social action
 as understandable only to the extent that it is purposeful and follows a
 linear-causal sequence.
 66. Ibid., p. 22. Also see: Brian Fay, Social Theory and Political Practice (London:
 George Allen & Unwin, 1975), pp. 54-55.
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 Consequently, understanding and meaning within the logic provided
 by Ostrom's individualism, if adopted as a daily philosophy of existence,
 will pose difficulty in explaining social action similar to that encountered
 by Weber. Namely, the type of reasoning processes employed in both
 Ostrom's and Weber's individualism explains action in a given, function-
 al, commonsense world context. On the other hand, it is "unable to ac-
 count for the cultural substructure that makes the common sense world
 possible in the first place."''67 Put simply, it employs a reasoning process
 in which means and ends are explicable, but not the ends themselves.
 Traditionally, substantive reason involves meaning in multiple dimen-
 sions. But in methodological individualism the notion of reason is reified
 as simply a mental process of the personal mind and then it is further
 limited to calculating means-ends relationships. Reflection on and con-
 sideration of various moral and/or political criteria is absent within the
 strategic logic of instrumental rationality.
 On the level of everyday human existence, Ostrom's methodological
 individualism, like Weber's, poses several problems for those persons
 who would adopt it as an everyday way of life. First, it encourages resig-
 nation in the face of the rationalization of life. Karl Loewith, in a cele-
 brated essay, vividly describes what occurs where methodological indi-
 vidualism becomes an everyday mode of individual reflection and activi-
 ty. He discusses specifically how even Weber himself came to recognize
 the ways in which purposive rationality in his ethic of responsibility and
 therefore in his own idea of man led culturally to rationalization of life.
 In other words, Weber saw how irrationality developed from the process
 of rationalization which stems from the relationship between means and
 ends. Weber noted how what
 was originally a means (to an otherwise valuable end) becomes an
 end-into-itself, actions intended as means become independent
 rather than goal-oriented and precisely thereby lose their original
 "meaning" or "end," i.e., their goal-oriented rationality based on
 man and his needs.68
 Weber suggests that this reversal of means and ends "marks all modern
 culture ... its institutions and enterprises are rationalized in such a way
 that it is these structures, originally set-up by man which now, in their
 turn, encompass and determine him like an iron-cage."69
 67. Rasmussen, "Between Autonomy and Sociality," p. 37.
 68. Karl Loewith, "Weber's Interpretation of the Bourgeois-Capitalistic World in Terms
 of the Guiding Principle of 'Rationalization'," in Max Weber, ed. Dennis Wrong (Engle-
 wood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1970), p. 114.
 69. Ibid., p. 114.
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 The adoption of methodological individualism as found in Ostrom or
 Weber's works serves, as an everyday way of reflection and activity to
 expedite the resignation described by Weber. Such a perspective encour-
 ages acceptance of what appears to be inevitable destiny, i.e., a form of
 determinism toward rationalized institutions. Within this universal
 bondage, the only meaningful concept of freedom accessible to the indi-
 vidual is restricted to self-responsibility. This occurs as understanding of
 freedom and meaning in this individualism is limited to that which is rele-
 vant to the inner man. In short, freedom and meaning in this mode are
 restricted to personal cognition and subjectivity.70
 Without alternate understandings of man and reason, freedom
 parallels the Weberian perspective of choosing to specialize in some
 endeavor and doing the best one knows how under the circumstances of
 an otherwise perceived deterministic universe. Freedom, in other words,
 is what is possible dependent ultimately upon one's own self and one's
 own actions.
 In sum, Ostrom's individualism does provide for self-responsibility for
 man as an autonomous creature. It does not, however, promote modes
 of understanding of how one's self and others are basically social beings.
 Nor does it facilitate political action for public participation. The most
 harmful effect of methodological individualism, if it is assumed to be a
 philosophy of everyday existence, is that it permits the individual to pro-
 mote and rationalize his cognitive dissonance and his alienation from
 fellow citizens and from his social institutions.
 VI. Conclusion
 Ostrom's model is clearly a more humane approach to administration
 than theories preoccupied with managerial efficiency or control under
 monocratic authority. It is also potentially more democratic in that he
 begins with the individual and builds from the bottom up. Also the frag-
 mentation and overlap of authority in his model work against the ob-
 vious concentration of power found in top-down organizational models.
 At the same time, the economic reasoning and subjective morality base
 of methodological individualism fosters human action that is essentially
 private. In order for administration to be more genuinely "public,"
 meaning more than merely a synonym for government, a theory of ad-
 ministration is needed which holds forth the promise of what William
 Dunn and Bahman Fozouni have called "administrative praxis." That
 70. Ibid., pp. 119-122.
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 is, administration which more authentically reflects the welfare of those
 served by organizations and requires "self-generating public action
 which transcends forces beyond human control."71 Such a theory neces-
 sitates a foundation in democratic morality accompanied by a social ra-
 tionality and an understanding of man's fundamental social nature.
 In the first place, public action requires processes for collaborative
 deliberation and participation. Public action necessitates the application
 of civic virtue in organizational life. The prospect that such processes can
 be developed is promoted when the ultimate value priority or the guiding
 social ethic of organization is founded squarely on democracy. Second,
 the potential for self-generating public action arises when a priority exists
 for comprehensive human development in organizational life. By "com-
 prehensive" is meant human development that includes but is not limited
 to psycho-social growth and includes education for personal growth as
 political citizens of the enterprise.
 Third, the achievement of public action is dependent on facilitating an
 understanding of man's rationality and being as thoroughly social.
 Man's understanding of his inherent sociality emerges from the recogni-
 tion that he arrives in the world where one's thinking is already condi-
 tioned, i.e., where as Rasmussen points out, "each individual is an ex-
 pression of his institutions."72 In short, social man is a determined being
 initially in organizational situations. But, more precisely, social man is a
 contingent being who, in association with others, works out his identity,
 autonomy, and freedom. These dimensions, rather than being dependent
 on solitary efforts of inner-based man, are socially earned through per-
 sonal efforts with others and within the social and objective conditions
 faced in organizational situations.
 The understanding that man is social, having both personal and collec-
 tive needs, means that man comes to awareness that both personal and
 social objectives are earned through continuous and mutual effort.
 Sociality also provides an individual with the recognition of how his
 enterprises are historically manmade and how the problems faced in
 workplace conditions are open to shared deliberation and action for
 modification or reconstruction.
 71. William N. Dunn and Bahman Fozouni, Toward a Critical Administrative Theory,
 Administrative and Policy Studies Series, Number 03-026 (Beverly Hills, CA: A Sage Pro-
 fessional Paper, 1976), 3, p. 62.
 72. Rasmussen, "Autonomy and Sociality," pp. 20-25.
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